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age policy in Germany, at the turn of the
millennium, has to face old and new chal-
lenges. Old challenges include wage moderation
and a more flexible wage structure in order to con-
tribute to a successful fight against persistently
high levels of unemployment. Three new chal-
lenges are frequently discussed in the public and in
the literature, namely skilled-biased technical
progress, increasing international integration of
labour, product and financial markets (“globalisa-
tion”), and the consequences of the monetary inte-
gration within the European Monetary Union
(EMU). To what extent do these aspects indeed
represent causes of the observed labour market
problems in Germany and what should be the
appropriate reaction of wage policy?
Upgrading of skills and the wage structure
By any measure, the German workforce has
become more skilled. Since labour force participa-
tion rates as well as the composition of employ-
ment with respect to gender, nationality, and num-
ber of working hours has changed dramatically
during the time period under consideration, the
group of high-skilled represents the more homoge-
nous population compared to the others. By and
large,the share of unskilled workers nearly halved,
whereas the corresponding figure for high-skilled
labour is now twice as high as 20 years ago.
What are the consequences of this skill-upgrading
for the wage structure? At first glance the answer
seems to be clear. In the conventional labour
demand and supply framework, the aforemen-
tioned substantial increase of skilled labour is
expected to reduce wages for high-skilled workers
relative to other qualifications. The reverse is
expected for wages of low-skilled workers. But this
is not what we observe. Wage growth for low and
high skilled workers was higher compared to that
of medium-skilled workers. Put differently, during
the past 20 years we observe a U-shaped pattern
across skill groups, i.e., wage dispersion increased
between medium and high-skilled workers and
decreased between unskilled and medium skilled
workers. This holds for both manufacturing and
non-manufacturing sectors. However, focusing
exclusively on low-skilled workers,we observe that
wage dispersion within this group remains fairly
unchanged over time. In contrast, for medium and
high-skilled workers one observes increasing wage
inequality within these groups. Taken together,
while wage inequality for full-time working males
increases in the time period under consideration,
this rise in inequality differs within and between
skill groups.
The trends for full-time working females are some-
what different.Wage dispersion across skill groups
and also within skill groups in the lower part of the
wage distribution decreased sharply from 1975 to
1990.On the other hand,wage dispersion for medi-
um-skilled females above the median tends to
increase substantially.
Summing up,the notion of the German wage struc-
ture as being fairly compressed and even tending
to become more compressed over time is only part-
ly correct. It obscures important differences bet-
ween skill groups, wage groups, and male and
female workers.The more important conclusion is,
however, that despite an increased supply of high-
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skilled workers their relative wages did not de-
cline. an increased supply of high-skilled workers,
their relative wages did not decline. Hence,
demand shifts in favour of high-skilled workers
must have occurred (and must be still at work).
Globalisation and skill-biased technical progress
suggest themselves as candidates for an explana-
tion of these demand shifts.
International trade
Conventional wisdom suggests that the expansion
of trade – due to, say, reduced trade barriers – will
tend to change the wage structure across skill
groups. Skilled-labour-abundant developed
economies expand their production and exports of
commodities that use skilled labour intensively
and their import demand for goods requiring low-
skilled labour. The opposite holds for emerging
low-skilled-labour-abundant countries. Hence,
wages of high-skilled labour will rise in developed
countries. In principle, wages of low-skilled labour
should decline unless wage policy tries to stem the
tide and pushes up low wages, with severe unem-
ployment consequences for low-skilled workers, as
may be observed in Germany. It goes without say-
ing that the relevant question is not whether inter-
national trade affects the wage structure at all.
Obviously, when Germany imports trainers pro-
duced by low-skilled and low-paid Chinese labour,
workers in a German factory producing shoes at
wages ten times those of the
Chinese workers will soon
find themselves on the dole.
The more interesting ques-
tion is the extent to which
“your wages are set in
Bejing” (R. Freeman).
The answer is: to some extent,
but not fully.The more jobs for
unskilled labour are available
in the non-traded goods sec-
tor, i.e. the service sector, the
more are the wages at the bot-
tom determined by domestic
forces. Moreover, in develop-
ing countries, wage aspirations
of workers will also rise, as
may be observed in some
South-Asian economies. As
recent econometric studies
show, there is empirical evidence which supports the
view that although international trade via competi-
tion from developing countries does affect relative
wages and the structure of employment to the detri-
ment of low-skilled workers, this effect can only
explain a minor component of the observed changes
of the wage structure. To some extent this result is
disappointing, if not puzzling, since it is at odds with
purely anecdotal evidence.However,trade pressures
on wages and employment may become stronger as
China, India, and some African economies become
integrated into the world economy.
Skill-biased technological change
A second possible explanation is that the increase
of the supply of high-skilled workers has been out-
paced by shifts in the demand for skilled workers,
so that the high-skill wage premium has increased.
The other side of the same coin is that this is also a
source of the labour market problems of low-
skilled workers.They either experience a decline in
their relative wage or in the absence of wages flex-
ible enough to square with these developments,
their employment opportunities are severely dam-
aged. This is the case in Germany, where low-
skilled labour bears the major – yet not the entire
– burden of unemployment.
While this view arguably provides a clear explana-
tion of what happened, it is not without its prob-
Skill Composition of the Labour Force in West Germany 1975 and 1995
Percentages
a)
Year Unskilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
Labour force
1975 37.4 49.2 7.0
1995 19.0 59.0 13.7
Total employment
1975 36.7 49.9 7.1
1995 16.6 60.2 14.4
Full-time working German males aged 18 to 65
1975 20.2 66.3 4.6
1995 12.3 68.3 10.2
a) Some individual skill-groups were omitted and some imprecision is due to rounding,
hence figures do not add to 100%.
Unskilled: no or unknown vocational training;
Medium-skilled: apprenticeship training completed;
High-skilled: university degree and degree of advanced college for higher education
(Fachhochschule).
Sources: – Labour force and total employment: Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissen-
schaft, Forschung und Technologie (1997), Grund- und Strukturdaten 1997/98,
Bonn; calculations by the author.
– Full-time workers: J. Möller (1999), “Die Entwicklung der qualifikatorischen
Lohn- und Beschäftigungsstruktur in Deutschland – Eine empirische Bestands-
aufnahme”, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 219 (forthcoming).lems. It is not sufficient to show that technological
change is the driving force behind the rising
demand for high-skilled workers. We also must
know what type of technological progress acceler-
ated since the early 1970s when labour market
problems began to evolve. Most new technologies
are supposed to have an adverse impact on the
demand for low-skilled workers.History provides a
huge body of evidence for industrialisation being
synonymous with (low-skilled) labour- saving tech-
nological progress. Obvious examples are the dif-
fusion of computers and related technologies and
changes in the organisation of work associated
with effectively utilising these technologies. But
the empirical evidence on the extent to which com-
puters (or pencils, too) have changed the wage
structure is anything but unambiguous. Secondly,
the impact of new technologies may also go the
other way. For example, the introduction of assem-
bly lines may favour low-skilled labour because of
the simple routine tasks.
Despite these caveats, the empirical evidence ten-
tatively suggests that skill-biased technical
progress is at work, indeed, but its impact differs
among sectors. Moreover, wage policy, too, shares
considerable responsibility for the high unemploy-
ment rates of low-skilled workers.
European Monetary Union
Pivotal to the establishment of EMU is the
removal of flexible nominal exchange rates and the
introduction of a single monetary policy. It has
been claimed that wage policy has to serve as a
substitute for nominal exchange rate adjustments
in the case of divergent economic developments
among EMU member countries.Other substitution
mechanisms for nominal exchange rate adjust-
ments, besides wage policy, are: labour mobility,
capital mobility, relative price changes, and finan-
cial transfers between EMU member countries.
While all these substitutes may be able to perform
the task in theory, in reality they are insufficient or
unwarranted or both. But had the adjustable
exchange rate in the pre-EMU era really served as
a reliable means to smooth divergent economic
developments?
First, as has been shown by various recent studies,
the variable nominal exchange rate of the
Deutsche Mark vis-à-vis major EMU currencies
was, in Germany, hardly an important adjustment
tool. Secondly, the nominal exchange rate mecha-
nism does not provide a realistic chance to escape
from the necessary domestic measures to over-
come adverse economic shocks. The burden of
adjustment remains to be borne at home. Third,
there is evidence that, on average, the nominal
exchange rate volatility resulted in job losses (in
Germany) during previous appreciations of the
Deutsche Mark, that were not justified by real fac-
tors. In EMU, however, this can no longer happen.
Seen from these viewpoints, there is no reason for
grieving over the loss of the nominal exchange rate
adjustability in EMU.
While this is good news, it does not suggest that in
the near future the nominal exchange rate mecha-
nism might not have been helpful in buying some
time for necessary adjustments.Hence,wage policy
as the substitute must be on guard.
Conclusion
What does all of this imply for wage policy in
Germany? Both, globalisation and skill-biased
technological change, and, to a lesser extent, EMU,
constitute challenges for wage policy with respect
to greater flexibility. But additional measures are
necessary, such as upgrading the skills of the work-
force and increasing the international competitive-
ness of the German economy. Clearly, not every-
one may be helped. To provide support to the
unskilled will no doubt impose a considerable
financial burden on society,including those who,as
a majority, are the definite winners of globalisation
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